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FOSTERING RELATIONSHIPS:
THE STATE AND PREGNANCY
NATHALIE LEVMAN*
RESUME
Cet article examine l'histoire de l'intervention judiciaire canadienne dans les
grossesses jusqu'A la decision de 1997 de la Cour supreme du Canada dans la cause
Winnipeg Child and Family Services c. D.F.G., et met en contraste l'approche centr~e
sur les droits du foetus avec l'approche des f~ministes les plus 6minentes en ce qui a
trait aux interventions dans les grossesses. L'article appuie le point de vue des
f6ministes que l'auto-violence maternelle et la prise de d6cisions malavis6e au cours
d'une grossesse sont plut6t des probl~mes d'ordre social que juridique. Cependant, on
y sugg~re 6galement que l'intervention de l'6tat devrait 8tre garantie dans les cas
extremes d' auto-violence maternelle lorsque toutes les autres mesures proactives ont
6chou6. Cette position se fonde sur une vision relationnelle de l'autonomie. Dans la
perspective relationnelle, on prend une d6cision de mani re autonome dans un con-
texte de relation de soutien favoris6 par des conditions sociales saines. Pour faire en
sorte qu'une femme enceinte prenne une d6cision autonome, la soci6t6 doit renforcer
le lien entre la femme et son foetus aussi bien que la relation entre la femme et l'6tat.
INTRODUCTION
Two recent Canadian cases have once again made state intervention in pregnancy and
the legal status of the fetus topical issues in legal thought. In the first case, an Ontario
court acquitted a mother of attempted murder in the shooting of her almost full-term
fetus.1 In the second case, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed an appellate court's
decision to set aside a lower court ruling, which ordered the detention of a pregnant
* © Copyright 1999, Nathalie Levman, B.A. (Hons.) (Toronto), M.A. (Toronto). The author will
receive her Bachelor of Laws from Osgoode Hall Law School in the spring of 1999. Thanks go to
Jeremy Dolgin and Roxanne Mykitiuk. This paper was written for Chloe Rebecca Bernice.
1. R. v. Drummond, (1996), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 5 C.R. (5th) 380, 112 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. Prov.
Ct. (Crim. Div.)) [hereinafter Drummond]. The mother was alleged to have fired a pellet gun into her
vagina.
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woman addicted to solvent sniffing for the protection of the fetus. 2 Both cases held
that the fetus had no legal status as a person until it was born alive.
For many years theorists have expressed passionate views on the role of the state to
intervene on the fetus' behalf and the imposition of criminal and civil liability on those
who cause harm to it. The debate hinges on whether the fetus should be granted legal
personhood and rights flowing therefrom.
Fetal rights advocates3 favour granting the fetus legal status and rights to justify
government intervention in pregnancy when the pregnant woman either refuses
treatment believed to be beneficial to the fetus, or endangers her fetus' health by
ingesting intoxicants. A corollary of this view is imposition of both civil and criminal
liability resulting from any failure to treat the fetus in accordance with its allotted
rights.
Many feminists, 4 on the other hand, strongly object to any recognition of legal status
and rights for the fetus. They are concerned about the potential infringement on
2. Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. D.F.G., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925, 152 D.L.R.
(4th) 193, 31 R.F.L. (4th) 165 [hereinafter D.F.G. cited to S.C.R.]. For recent case comments on the
D.F.G. case, see F. Baylis, "Dissenting with the Dissent: Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G.
(D.F.) (1998) 36 Alta L. Rev. 785; T. Caulfield & E. Nelson, "Winnipeg Child and Family Services
v. D.F.G.: A Commentary on the Law, Reproductive Autonomy and the Allure of Technopolicy"
(1998) 36 Alta L. Rev. 799; T.B. Dawson, "First Person Familiar. Judicial Intervention in Preg-
nancy, Again: G.(D.F.)" (1998) 10 Can. J. Women & L. 213; F.C. De Coste, "Winnipeg Child and
Family Services (Northwest Area) v. D.F.G.: The Impossibility of Fetal Rights and the Obligations
of Judicial Governance" (1998) 36 Alta L. Rev. 725; B. Elman & J. Mason, "The Failure of Dia-
logue: Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G. (D.F.) (1998) 36 Alta L. Rev. 768; S. Rodgers,
"Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. D.F.G.: Juridical Interference with Pregnant Women in the
Alleged Interest of the Fetus" (1998) 36 Alta L. Rev. 711; L. Shanner, "Pregnancy Intervention and
Models of Maternal-Fetal Relationship: Philosophical Reflections on the Winnipeg C.F.S. Dissent"
(1998) 36 Alta L. Rev. 751.
3. See S. Balisy, "Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus"
(1987) 60 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1209; E. Keyserlingk, The Unborn Child's Right to Prenatal Care: A
Comparative Law Perspective (McGill Legal Study No.5) (Montreal: McGill University, Quebec
Research Center of Private and Comparative Law, 1984); J. Lenow, "The Fetus as Patient: Emerging
Rights as a Person?" (1983) 9 Am. J.L. & Med.; J.A. Robertson, "Procreative Liberty and Control of
Conception" (1983) 69 Virg. L. Rev. 405; G. Smith, "Fetal Abuse: Culpable Behaviour by Pregnant
Women or Parental Immunity?" (1990) 3 J. L. & Health 223.
4. See J. Berrien, "Pregnancy and Drug Use: The Dangerous and Unequal Use of Punitive Measures"
(1990) 2 Yale J.L. & Feminism 239; J. Daniels, "Court-Ordered Caesareans: A Growing Concern for
Indigent Women" (1988) 21 Clearinghouse Rev. 1064; T.B. Dawson, "Re Baby R: A Comment on
Fetal Apprehension" (1990) 4 Can. J. Women & L. 265; J. Gallagher, "Prenatal Invasions and Inter-
ventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights" (1987) 10 Harv. Women's L.J. 9; I. Grant, "Forced
Obstetrical Intervention: A Charter Analysis" (1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 217; J. Hanigsberg, "Power and
Procreation: State Interference in Pregnancy" (1991) 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 35; J. Holmgren, "Legal
Accountability and Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: When Fixing the Blame Doesn't Fix the Problem"
(1991) 36 So. Dak. L. Rev. 81; R. Hubbard, "Legal and Policy Implications of Recent Advances in
Prenatal Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy" (1982) 7 Women's Rights L.R. 201; M. Jackman, 'The Cana-
dian Charter as a Barrier to Unwanted Treatment of Pregnant Women in the Interests of the Fetus"
(1993) 14 Health L. Can. 49; D. Johnsen, 'The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women's
The State and Pregnancy
women's autonomy should these "fetal rights" conflict with the rights of pregnant
women. According to this view, the coercive effects of state intervention in pregnancy
and the liabilities which would flow from allowing such action would seriously and
irreparably harm the rights of women.
These feminists recognize self-inflicted abuse and uninformed decision-making dur-
ing pregnancy as significant societal problems caused often by poor economic and
social conditions and reject the underlying assumption of fetal rights advocates that
the problem is situated in each "offending" mother. From this feminist viewpoint, the
solution lies in addressing the societal conditions which have caused the problem in
the first place, rather than pitting mother against fetus by balancing two distinct sets
of rights. This position rejects any kind of coercion of the pregnant woman, primarily
because coercion infringes on autonomy. Not all feminist theory, however, necessarily
leads to the conclusion that every kind of state intervention in pregnancy would
seriously infringe on women's autonomy. A feminist reconception of autonomy may
justify limited coercion in rare cases where all other efforts at a pro-active approach
to address the systemic problems have failed.
Many feminists condemn all intervention because they do not distinguish between two
different contexts in which the state may want to intervene in pregnancy. Where a
woman has made an informed choice not to undergo a medical procedure, any
abrogation of that decision would constitute infringement of her autonomy. However,
where women suffer from addictions or are unable to provide themselves or their
fetuses with a proper level of care due to adverse social conditions, it is questionable
whether they are exercising autonomous free choice at all. In these cases, intervention
may actually fulfil feminist goals to improve the social conditions in which women
and their children live.5
Autonomy should not be viewed so much as a value which requires separation and
protection from others, but rather as a value which is fostered within the relationships
in which it is formed. This "relational" 6 approach maintains that autonomy can only
develop in the context of relationships which provide the security and dignity neces-
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection" (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 599; D. Krauss,
"Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights Theory on Childbirth Decisions
and Women of Color" (1991) 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 523; S. Martin & M. Coleman, "Judicial
Intervention in Pregnancy" (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 947; C. Overall, "Pluck a Fetus From its Womb: A
Critique of Current Attitudes Toward the Embryo/Fetus" (1986) 24 U.W.O.L. Rev. 1; S.A. Tateishi,
"Apprehending the Fetus en ventre sa mire: A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand" (1989) 53 Sask. L.
Rev. 113.
5. State intervention does not necessarily translate into coercion and repression. For example, the state
may institute outreach programs which supply information, counselling and care to willing partici-
pants.
6. For relational theory in general, see J. Nedelsky, "Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self" (1990) 30
Representations 162; J. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities"
(1989) 1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 7; J. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship" (1993) 1 Rev.
Const. Studies 1; M. Minow, Making All the Difference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
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sary to make truly "free" choices. Put simply, an individual cannot make autonomous
choices when societal constraints have placed her in a position where she has very few
or no options from which to choose.
From this view of autonomy which focuses on fostering the relationships which
generate it, a new conception of rights is formed. Rights are no longer to be viewed
as protecting defined spheres of individual action into which the collective cannot
intrude. Rather, rights are to be seen as:
... structuring the relations between individuals and sources of collective power so
that autonomy is fostered rather than undermined. 7
Such an approach, in certain extreme cases, justifies minor infringements on an
individual right,8 in the interests of fostering the present and future relationships
between pregnant woman and fetus, and pregnant woman and state. Pro-active
intervention may be preferable to standing by helplessly as these relationships deteri-
orate to the point where more drastic action becomes necessary.9 This approach does
not advocate an opposing position to the feminist one by encouraging notions of fetal
rights. Rather, it reaffirms feminist critiques of the fetal rights movement, while at the
same time providing a different kind of recourse to state assistance in extreme cases,
under the guidance of feminist warnings and suggestions.
This paper discusses state intervention in pregnancy in five sections. The first section
will examine Canadian case law to provide a foundation for the discussion. The courts
have moved away from an interventionist position toward recognizing pregnant
women's "autonomy". However, neither of these approaches provides an adequate
solution to the problem of maternal self-abuse during pregnancy. Current case law
calls out for reform. The second section will discuss the fetal rights approach to state
intervention with a view to highlighting the theoretical and practical weaknesses of
this position in its denial of the unique relationship between the pregnant woman and
her fetus. It also warns of the results of according fetuses rights equal to those of their
mothers. The third section, which examines the most prominent feminist approach,
also indicates many of the dangers inherent in the fetal rights position, but primarily
discusses feminist positions on state intervention in pregnancy. This section's exami-
nation of the risks of state intervention to women will significantly inform the fourth
section, which attempts to reconceive autonomy, according to feminist relational
theory, and to construct a notion of rights in terms of fostering relationships to provide
a theoretical basis for limited state intervention in pregnancy. The fifth section will
attempt to justify, from a relational perspective, state intervention in extreme cases
while accounting for the feminist concerns outlined in the third section. It will also
7. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship", Ibid. at 8.
8. In the sense of a liberty, or an individual's right to conduct herself in the manner in which she
pleases.
9. Such as child apprehension proceedings after birth.
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sketch a scheme capable of implementing a feminist approach to government involve-
ment which affirms the relationship between the pregnant woman and her fetus.
I. CASE LAW
Canadian case law involving judicial intervention in pregnancy can be grouped under
two headings which describe different contexts in which judicial intervention has been
applied for and utilized. Applications for apprehensions of the fetus have occurred
both where the pregnant woman has refused medical attention deemed necessary for
the fetus' welfare, and where the pregnant woman's conduct has "endangered" the
fetus' well-being. The medical intervention and maternal self-abuse l0 cases will be
dealt with separately as it is this author's position that the two different contexts
warrant different kinds of intervention.
The phrase "medical intervention" refers to procedures which doctors have prescribed
as necessary to preserve the life or health of the fetus, such as caesarean-sections or
intra-uterine blood transfusions. A woman's refusal of such procedures may be the
result of religious or conscientious beliefs, lack of faith in the medical system, or other
reasons, but generally her decisions are made on the basis of a belief that she is acting
in her own best interests and in the best interests of her fetus. The goal is not to
advocate for forced intervention where a woman has made an informed decision not
to undergo a medical procedure.
Maternal self-abuse includes cases where women are placing their own health at risk
as well as the health of their fetuses. Generally, because of poor social conditions and
disadvantage, " these women live in situations where their capacity to choose a healthy
lifestyle during pregnancy is extremely constricted. Although pregnant women in
these cases often require medical attention, their situation differs from most medical
intervention cases since they require ongoing assistance and support, not just medi-
cally but also emotionally and financially. It is within this type of situation that this
paper envisages a form of limited intervention.
After the discussion of judicial intervention in pregnancy, the law on both civil and
criminal liability which may result from a mother's failure to take proper care of the
fetus is briefly examined. Past developments in this area of the law provide preliminary
warnings of the risks of according fetuses rights as well as the dangers of leaving the
system as it now exists.
10. I prefer the phrase "maternal self-abuse" to the more common "fetal endangerment" as it focuses
attention on the need of both the mother and the fetus for support and care, rather than evoking
notions of the fetus needing protection from its mother who is causing harm to it.
11. In a relatively recent American study of court-ordered obstetrical interventions, 81 per cent of the
women involved were Black, Asian, or Hispanic, 44 per cent were unmarried, and 24 per cent did
not speak English as their primary language. All the women were treated in a teaching-hospital clinic
or were receiving public assistance: V.E.B. Kolder et al., "Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions"
(1987) 316 N.Eng. J. Medicine 1192 at 1192.
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a) Medical Intervention
The most common applications for medical intervention in pregnancy involve preg-
nant women who have refused to undergo a caesarean section which a doctor has
prescribed as necessary for the safe birth of the fetus. The Re Baby R case 12 illustrates
a typical judicial response. The mother, Ms. R, had refused a caesarean section because
she believed that it would be safe for her to deliver vaginally. Her doctor immediately
contacted the child welfare authority who authorized the doctor "to do what was
required medically for the child" but clearly stated that "he was not consenting to any
medical procedure to be performed on the mother." 13. The lower court upheld this
authorization of intervention on the basis that the child was in need of protection due
to the mother's failure to ensure proper medical attention to her fetus. Further, Ms.
R's refusal to undergo a caesarean section, together with her drug and alcohol abuse
during pregnancy, were held to constitute "prenatal abuse" and such "abuse" was
sufficient to establish permanent guardianship of the child after birth. 14 The court
ignored the fact that Ms. R had consented to the caesarean section shortly before the
birth of her child.
On appeal, MacDonnell J. held that the apprehension of the fetus was pre-birth and
intended solely to ensure the safe delivery of the child. After underlining the difficulty
of conceptualizing a fetus' medical treatment as not affecting the mother, the judge
found that because the mother had consented to the caesarean section and because the
fetus had no legal status as a person until born, there was no factual or legal basis for
the apprehension. He followed two abortion cases15 which stated that live birth was
the line of demarcation identifying when a fetus became a child. He stressed the drastic
nature of fetal apprehension in terms of its infringement on citizens' rights, stating
that there must be express legislation authorizing such action before courts could
intervene, and that it was not satisfactory to apply legislation designed for other
contexts, such as child welfare.
16
12. (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 69, 15 R.F.L. (3d) 225, 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 237 (B.C.S.C.).
13. Re R. (1987), 9 R.F.L. (3d) 415 at 416 (B.C. Prov. Ct. (Fam. Div.)).
14. Findings of prenatal abuse have posed another significant threat to the rights of pregnant women.
Even where mothers have sought help for their addictions during pregnancy, their conduct has been
used to find the child in need of protection after birth. See Re Superintendent of Family and Child
Service and McDonald (1982), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 330 (B.C.S.C.). See also, on prenatal abuse gener-
ally: Re Children's Aid Society for Kenora (District) & J.L (1981), 134 D.L.R. (3d) 249 (Ont. Prov.
Ct. (Farn. Div.)); M.M.C.1. v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Family and Child Services)
(1991), 31 R.F.L. (3d) 3 (B.C.S.C.).
15. Dehler v. Ottawa Civic Hospital (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 748, 101 D.L.R. (3d) 686, 14 C.P.C. 4 (H.C.),
aff'd 29 O.R. (2d) 677, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 512 (C.A.) [hereinafter Dehler]; Medhurst v. Medhurst
(1984), 46 O.R. (2d) 263,9 D.L.R. (4th) 252,38 R.F.L. (2d) 225 (H.C.).
16. He also followed an English case, Re F., [1988] W.L.R. 1288, 2 All E.R. 193 (C.A.), which clearly
establishes that there is no jurisdiction to apprehend a fetus since, for the apprehension to be effec-
tive, there must be a measure of control over the mother. Such powers to interfere with the rights of
women must be granted by specific legislation.
The State and Pregnancy
Fortunately, the inconsistencies of the decision at first instance were corrected on
appeal. However, the negative implications of the lower court decision are illustrative
of the significant dangers of judicial authorization of medical intervention in preg-
nancy. Since the lower court implicitly recognized a right of the fetus to be born in a
healthy condition, it was able to overlook the implications of intervention for women's
rights by focusing on fetal rights. The decision assumed that the pregnant woman and
her fetus were separate entities on whom different sets of procedures could be
performed. Importantly, the decision did nothing to foster the relationship between
mother and child: the child was promptly removed from its mother's care after birth.
There was also no attempt to take into account the oppressive social conditions of the
women against whom these orders are generally made.
Although the appeal court's decision attempted to address some of the problems
outlined above, in general, courts do not have the ability to deal with the systemic
problems which lead to these situations. These problems require programs to help
women understand medical procedures better and so make more informed choices. 17
There should also be some preventative measures taken to ensure that a history of
self-abuse during pregnancy is not presumed to preclude a healthy future relationship
between mother and child.
b) Maternal Self-Abuse
The maternal self-abuse cases also show a movement away from judicial intervention
toward a recognition of women's autonomy. In the past, courts have readily confined
women in the "interests" of their fetuses. However, recently, judges have refused to
override pregnant women's decisions. While the former approach has had negative
repercussions for women's autonomy, the current approach does not address important
social factors. Although pregnant women's health care decisions are now respected,
little assistance is available for those women who require it, thus potentially subjecting
them to future discipline by child welfare authorities should they be considered unfit
mothers because of their self-abuse during pregnancy. Currently, the case law simply
postpones dealing with maternal self-abuse during pregnancy until after the fetus is
born when the damage to the maternal-fetal relationship is already done.
Children's Aid Society of City of Belleville (City) v. L.T. (No. 2)18 exemplifies the
courts' past interventionist tendencies. Here, the court held that a fetus could be found
in need of protection under section 37 of Ontario's Child and Family Services Act 19
due to the neglectful conduct of the fetus' mother during pregnancy. The mother had
failed to seek medical attention when she experienced abnormal discharge and severe
17. For example, outreach programs in health care centers designed to address the individual problems
of women in particular communities, including services in the predominant languages spoken in
those communities as well as health care workers who understand the specific community's needs.
18. (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 204, 7 R.F.L. (3d) 191 (Ont. Prov. Ct. (Fam. Div.)) [hereinafter Children's Aid
Society of Belleville cited to R.F.L.].
19. S.O. 1984, c.C-55.
(1999) 14 Journal of Law and Social Policy
abdominal pain. Her "erratic" conduct and the court's finding that her attitude was
"not conducive to the safe and healthy delivery of the child", 20 also factored into the
court's decision to apprehend the fetus. Importantly, the court made an order for
assessment under section 10 of the Mental Health Act 21 and declared the fetus to be a
ward of the society for three months. In focusing solely on the welfare of the fetus,
the court not only completely overlooked the mother's rights and the necessity of
addressing the socio-economic problems underlying this case, but also individualized
the blame. The situation became this particular mother's fault.22
In Re A,23 the judge effectively reversed the decision in Children's Aid Society of
Belleville, since he found no evidence that the definition of "child" in the Ontario Child
and Family Services Act included the fetus. Here the pregnant woman suffered from
a serious medical condition, toxemia, which endangered both her own life and that of
her fetus. Her conduct revealed no intention to seek any kind of medical care.
Consequently, child welfare authorities sought an order to compel the pregnant woman
to alter her conduct and provide her fetus with medical attention. The judge found that
since the fetus acquired personhood only after birth, 24 there was no jurisdiction to
proceed under child welfare legislation. He also refused to exercise his parens patriae
jurisdiction, on the basis that the essence of that power was to protect a child in place
of its parent, not to coerce the mother to protect her fetus. 25 He concluded that,
although the state did have an interest in protecting the fetus, such protection could
not be granted by the courts, and that if there were to be intervention, the means and
criteria ought to be left for the legislature.
This case illustrates the court's inability to offer support without coercion. No pro-
grams have been implemented to offer specialized services, and few, if any, facilities
exist which are designed to provide proper emotional and medical support. In addition,
no legislation exists which addresses the unique characteristics of these situations, so
that courts have applied legislation from other contexts, such as child welfare or mental
health statutes, which do not provide due process or proper protection for pregnant
women's rights.
Joe v. Yukon (Director of Family and Children's Services)26 is unique in that it involved
legislation which authorized forced supervision in cases where the Director had
20. The mother claimed she would deliver the child "wherever": supra note 18 at 193.
21. R.S.O. 1980, c.M-262.
22. In fact the judge specifically declined to take account of any economic factors when judging the
mother's conduct: supra note 18 at 193.
23. (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 82, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 722, 28 R.F.L. (3d) 288 (Unif. Fain. Ct.) [hereinafter cited
to O.R.].
24. Following Dehler, supra, note 15.
25. Steinberg U.F.C.J. stated: "I believe that the parens patriae jurisdiction is just not broad enough to
envisage the forcible confinement of a parent as a necessary incident of its exercise" (supra note 23
at 92).
26. (1986), 5 B.C.L.R. (2d) 267, 1 Y.R. 169 (Y.T.S.C.).
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reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a fetus was being subjected to a serious
risk of suffering from fetal alcohol syndrome. 27 Although the appeal was dismissed
as moot because the mother voluntarily complied with the order, it was held that the
legislative provision infringed section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms28 as its vagueness lacked substantive fairness. The Act did not define fetal
alcohol syndrome, nor did the judge at first instance attempt to define it or allow
counsel to make submissions regarding its meaning. This case is useful as a warning
to those who wish to authorize intervention through legislation, that they will have to
address and account for pregnant women's rights under section 7 of the Charter and
attend carefully to the conditions under which infringements of rights may be permit-
ted under section 1.
The most recent maternal self-abuse case, Winnipeg Child and Family Services v.
D.EG.,29 involved an appeal from an order committing a pregnant woman to the
custody of the Director of Child and Family Services and empowering him to dictate
her medical treatment. The order was purportedly based on the woman's mental health,
as she was addicted to sniffing solvents. However, as the Manitoba Court of Appeal
pointed out,30 the agency's real concern was the welfare of the fetus. The appellate
court held that either the court could make a direct order for protection of the fetus or
it could not, but that it would not be allowed to do indirectly what could not be done
directly. Since the fetus was not a legal person in any jurisdiction3' and the parens
patriae jurisdiction was only exercisable after the child was born, there was no legal
foundation for fetal protection. Again, the court found itself unable to intervene in
such a complex issue, deciding that any reform must be left to the legislature, the
"body directly answerable to society": 32
... I do not see how a court can select which conduct harmful to an unborn child
should be restrained and which not. That is more properly a legislative function. 33
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the appellate court's decision by a seven to
two majority. McLachlin J., who wrote the majority judgement, reiterated that a fetus
had no legal personhood until birth, with the result that a woman's actions could not
27. Section 134(1) of Yukon Territory's Children's Act, S.Y.T. 1984, c.2. Subsection 134(1) is now
s.133 of R.S.Y. 1986, c.C-22. The only other jurisdiction which specifically authorizes state inter-
vention in pregnancy is the New Brunswick. See Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c.C-21,
C.C.S.N.B., c.F-2.2, s. 1, which defines "child" to include "unborn child".
28. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.1 1
[hereinafter the Charter].
29. Supra note 2.
30. Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. D.F.G. (1996), 113 Man. R. (2d) 3, 131 W.A.C. 3, 138
D.L.R. (4th) 254 (C.A.) [hereinafter cited to Man. R.].
31. With the exception of New Brunswick: supra note 27. However, intervention based on New
Brunswick's Family Services Act probably would not pass Charter scrutiny, in view of the D.F.G.
decision.
32. D.F.G., supra note 30 at 11.
33. Ibid. at 9.
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be restrained either through tort law or through the court's parens patriae jurisdiction.
Any change to this principle would involve important moral choices and would create
conflicts between fundamental interests and rights.34 Since the common law was
limited to incremental change, and the complex ramifications of any alteration to the
common law permitting confinement of pregnant women were too difficult for the
court to assess, any such change ought to be made by the legislature. 35
Importantly, McLachlin J. recognized that, before birth, the pregnant woman and her
fetus were one, since the fetus was intimately connected with, and could not be
regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant woman. She stated that any change
to the common law of tort would create an antagonistic relation between pregnant
woman and fetus, which would contradict the reality of the physical situation: the
woman and her fetus were bonded in a union separable only by birth. 36 McLachlin J.
also recognized that any test which imposed a duty of care on a pregnant woman
toward her fetus would probably have the greatest impact on minority and disadvan-
taged women who tended to have less access to information about medical care. She
specifically emphasized that the parens patriae jurisdiction did not permit the court
to make decisions for a competent person regarding her own body.37 Any such
significant change to the common law would have to be effected by the legislature in
compliance with the Charter.38
The dissenting opinion took a very different approach to the ability of the common
law to address changing circumstances. Major J. maintained that the common law "has
proven to be adaptable to meet exigent circumstances as they arise". 39 Consequently,
he had no problem with extending the parens patriae jurisdiction to restrain a pregnant
woman where there was a reasonable probability of her causing irreparable harm to
her fetus. 40 He maintained that the parens patriae jurisdiction was intended to deal
with uncontemplated situations where it appeared necessary. He extended its ambit to
the fetus by finding the "born alive" rule antiquated in light of modern medicine,
calling it a "legal anachronism based on rudimentary medical knowledge. ' 41
Although Major J. outlined a relatively restrictive test to determine whether confine-
ment was warranted, 42 he did not have a plan for addressing the systemic causes of
34. Supra note 2 para. 20.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. at para. 29.
37. Ibid. at para. 56.
38. Ibid..at para. 58.
39. Ibid. at para. 61.
40. Ibid. at para. 93.
41. Ibid. at para. 102.
42. Ibid. at para. 96:
(1) The woman must have decided to carry the child to term.
(2) Proof must be presented to a civil standard that the abusive activity will cause serious and
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ations. Moreover, he placed the blame on the pregnant woman by conceptualizing an
antagonistic relationship where the fetus was a separate entity "suffering from its
mother's abusive behaviour". 43 He pointed to two sets of rights, those of the mother
and those of the fetus, and stated that a fundamental precept of our society was that it
could restrict an individual's right to autonomy where the exercise of that right caused
harm to others.44 There was no recognition of the unique and inextricable relationship
between mother and fetus. Interestingly, he even envisaged himself as speaking for
those "who cannot speak for themselves". 45 In his view, the fetus was a separate entity
which had an implicit right to be born healthy and, importantly, which was in need of
the court's protection from its mother who was abusing it.
Since Canadian case law maintains that a fetus is not a person and the courts
consequently cannot intervene on its behalf, it seems to accept that the court is not an
adequate forum to deal with the complexities of such problems. The result, however,
is that no assistance or support is provided to pregnant women who are poorly
informed or suffer from addictions, nor are the poor economic conditions which are
often at the root of the problem addressed. This inaction leads to the blame being
continuously directed at individual "offending" women insofar as the courts insinuate
that they would like to intervene, if only the law did not prohibit intervention. Such
consistent calls to the legislature to deal with this problem may provide motivation to
Parliament to take some preventative measures. Effort must be made to avoid inter-
vention programs based on the notion of fetal rights since such an approach could
seriously and negatively affect a mother's relationship with her fetus and future child.
Any potential legislative action ought to avoid the dangers illustrated in the cases
authorizing intervention and address the causes of the problem rather than the casu-
alties.
It cannot be ignored that there is a strong undercurrent supporting the notion of fetal
rights, as represented by the dissent in the D.F.G. case. Such strong views seriously
influence how society conceptualizes motherhood and the problems a pregnant woman
may face in bringing a child into this world. Therefore, any attempt to address such
problems must do more than improve difficult social conditions and provide much
needed support and care. It must also challenge the idea that a mother who inflicts
abuse on herself while pregnant is a bad mother from whom her fetus and future
children need protection.
irreparable harm to the foetus.
(3) The remedy must be the least intrusive option.
(4) The process must be procedurally fair.
43. Ibid. at para. 91.
44. Ibid atpara. 131.
45. Ibid. at para. 140.
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c) Criminal and Civil Liability
Civil liability for harm a pregnant women has caused her fetus in utero may only be
imposed after the fetus has been born alive.46 Even then the law is uncertain as to the
extent to which a woman may be held responsible for her conduct during pregnancy.
Traditionally, parents have enjoyed immunity from such actions in the interest of
preserving family harmony. However, recently, the law has been expanding to include
liability for a mother's negligent driving which causes harm to a fetus.
47
Civil liability is a reactionary measure designed to provide compensation expostfacto.
If the law were to expand to include liability for all types of parental negligence,
emphasis would be placed on the results of the problem rather than the cause itself.
Any attempt to develop a new scheme dealing with state intervention into pregnancy
ought to take an exclusively pro-active approach by banning imposition of any kind
of maternal civil liability. By focusing efforts on addressing the causes, the problem
would be properly addressed as societal rather than as the fault of each "offending"
mother.
Criminal law in Canada has firmly established that a fetus is not a human being for
the purposes of the Criminal Code.48 Therefore, a pregnant woman cannot be charged
with committing a crime against a fetus. In Drummond,49 a recent case where a woman
was charged with attempting to murder her fetus, it was held that the definition of
homicide was based on the victim being a human being. The judge followed R. v.
Sullivan5o in which it was held that a fetus was not a person until born alive. In Sullivan,
two midwives were acquitted of criminal negligence causing death, after a fetus in
their care died while in the birth canal.
Although, in Canada, criminal law cannot be used directly to punish the acts of
pregnant women, 51 it may be used indirectly to limit their behaviour while pregnant.
Women have been sentenced to jail terms for crimes which would not normally carry
a sentence, in order to "protect" their fetuses. For example, Andrea MacKenzie, a
young woman who pleaded guilty in a Toronto Provincial Court to charges of
communicating for the purposes of prostitution was sentenced to 60 days in prison.
46. lbid at para. 17.
47. Keyserlingk, supra note 3 at 41-7. Also see Dobson (Litigation Guardian) v. Dobson (1997), 148
D.L.R. (4th) 332, 189 N.B.R. (2d) 208, 37 C.C.L.T. (2d) 103 (C.A.), holding that a child could
recover for injuries inflicted in utero by a mother's negligent driving of a motor vehicle, but not for
injuries occasioned as a result of a pregnant woman's lifestyle choices. Leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada was allowed ((1997), 194 N.B.R. (2d) 320n, 496 A.P.R. 320n (S.C.C.))
and argument was heard in December 1998. However, no decision has yet been released.
48. R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46.
49. Supra, note 1.
50. (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (B.C.C.A.).
51. In the United States, however, seventeen states have criminally charged pregnant women with man-
slaughter, delivering drugs to newborn children and prenatal child abuse. See Holmgren, supra note
4 at 81.
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Ms. Mackenzie, who was eight and a half months pregnant at the time, explained that
she had been seeking other jobs but was unable to find work, and needed a way to
support herself and her four year old child. Provincial Court Judge Hogg clarified his
rationale for the imposition of an unusually lengthy sentence:
I cannot comprehend what would drive a woman to act in this manner, and the only
way to protect this child is to have this child born in custody, and hopefully things
will be done about it.52
Importantly, in this case there was no evidence that Ms. Mackenzie abused drugs or
alcohol, nor was there evidence that the fetus was at risk.
This kind of sentencing poses serious threats to pregnant women's rights and health.
No matter how criminal liability is imposed, whether directly or using a smaller crime
as a proxy, the solution is reactionary and consequently does nothing to assist the
pregnant woman's poor economic conditions or preserve the relationship between the
pregnant woman and her fetus. In fact, it has quite the opposite result, placing the
pregnant woman at a further disadvantage economically by taking her away from
potential job opportunities. It also may contribute to severing the relationship between
pregnant woman and fetus by providing evidence of parental unfitness, which child
welfare authorities may use once the child is born to justify finding it in need of
protection. 53 As with the imposition of civil liability, criminal liability shifts the focus
from fixing the cause to punishing the casualties and individualizing the blame.
II. THE FETAL RIGHTS POSITION
Fetal rights advocates 54 strive for a protective and anticipatory approach as well as a
legal regime which permits compensation. They wish to provide protective legal
mechanisms to stop further "abuse" of the fetus and afford "needed" care. They stress
that the fetus must be considered to be separate from the pregnant woman, with its
own interests and needs. 55 If it were accorded legal status as a person and the right to
be born healthy, the fetus could be viewed as a child for the purposes of all child
welfare legislation. Justification for granting juridical personality is based on the
essential continuity between the child's unborn and born status: what happens to the
fetus may affect the life of the future child.
From this perspective, the scheme for state intervention in pregnancy would be based
on existing child welfare legislation. The duties of a parent could be deduced from the
criteria to determine when a child is in need of protection. Once the fetus is found to
52. Cited in Dawson, supra note 4 at 270 as R. v. Mackenzie, Transcript of Guilty Plea and Submissions
to Sentencing, August 3, 1988 (Ont. Prov. Ct., D. Hogg J.), 7-8. In the United States, criminal sanc-
tions are also used as preventative measures: see Holmgren, supra note 4 at 90.
53. Ms. Mackenzie's child was apprehended by the child welfare authorities immediately after birth.
54. In the following few paragraphs I am primarily describing the position taken by Keyserlingk, who is
considered one of the most prominent Canadian fetal rights advocates.
55. Keyserlingk, supra note 3 at 99.
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be in need of protection, interventions would be adapted to fetuses under the remedies
sections. Remedies such as supervision orders and placement in institutions would
apply. 56 To determine whether a fetus is in need of protection, a careful balancing of
the rights of the fetus against those of the mother is proposed. The benefits of the
intervention for the fetus, for the pregnant woman and her family and the advantages
to society should be examined and weighed against the potential risks to the fetus and
the pregnant woman, the accuracy of diagnosis and the prognosis for success.
Flowing from the concept of fetal personhood and rights is the imposition of civil
liability as a result of the failure to uphold such rights. This approach maintains that
a legal duty should be imposed on pregnant women to protect the fetus, 57 the breach
of which may be tortious. The duty would mandate provision of care which best
promotes an adequate level of health for the fetus. General tort law principles would
be followed in establishing a duty of reasonable care,58 proving fault to establish
negligence and proving a causal connection to the resultant damage.
This approach also encourages imposition of criminal liability against third parties
and the pregnant woman. The fetal rights position on the role of criminal law derives
from a working paper of the Law Reform Commission of Canada. 59 Interestingly, the
paper does not advocate the granting of legal personhood to the fetus. Instead, it
attempts to effect the same result without dealing with the controversial subject of
fetal rights. It recommends the creation of a new crime specifically geared toward
fetuses. In part, this provision would provide as follows:
(1) Everyone commits a crime who
(b) being a pregnant woman, purposely causes destruction or serious harm
to her fetus by any act or by failing to make reasonable provision for
assistance in respect of her delivery.
(2) Section 1 [sic] applies even though the destruction or harm results after the
fetus becomes a person.60
The fact that the proposed provisions would relieve pregnant women of liability where
the destruction or harm was the result of life saving or health preserving measures
61
is small comfort to women who would risk being charged criminally even for
inadvertent acts during pregnancy.
56. Ibid. at 110.
57. Ibid., at 72.
58. Ibid. at 83.
59. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Crimes Against the Foetus (Working Paper 58) by E.W. Key-
serlingk (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1989).
60. Ibid at51.
61. In this proposed scheme, no liability would attach for harm resulting from lawful abortion or from
medical treatment for the mother's benefit to which she has consented: Ibid. at 53-57.
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The fetal rights approach avoids addressing the cause of the problem and so fails to
change the social conditions which bring about such situations. It both implicitly and
explicitly places blame on the individual woman by focusing the attention entirely on
her conduct and making her both criminally and civilly responsible for her actions. It
also creates an adversarial relationship between the pregnant woman and her fetus by
viewing the woman's rights as being overridden by those of her fetus. There is no
emphasis on preserving the relationship between pregnant woman and fetus. Rather,
a woman who asserts her rights to the detriment of her fetus is assumed to be unfit for
motherhood. This approach applies legislation not tailored for the specific context of
intervention in pregnancy and so fails to provide proper safeguards for the mother's
rights.
III. A FEMINIST CRITIQUE AND SOLUTION
The most prominent feminist critique of state intervention in pregnancy is centred on
a rejection of fetal rights as a legal basis for intervention. Feminists generally wish to
preserve the fetus' status of non-personhood in order to protect pregnant women from
coercion. They maintain that state protection of fetuses may appear benevolent, but
that when it is coercive, it disempowers women by infringing on their autonomy, which
"further subjects them to the arbitrary control of patriarchal power. '62 In this section,
the main feminist arguments against intervention are grouped according to those that
critique state intervention generally and those that specifically critique apprehensions
intended to negate the refusal to undergo medical treatment.
a) General Critique of State Intervention in Pregnancy
The key feminist critique of granting fetuses personhood and rights in order to justify
state intervention in pregnancy is that it leads to blaming individual women for
"complex societal drug and infant mortality problems". 63 By emphasizing the import-
ance of fetal rights, rather than maternal needs, this approach fails to recognize the
larger causal problems such as the effects of malnutrition due to poverty, physical
abuse and lack of adequate prenatal education and care. 64 According to Gallagher:
[T]he focus on fetal rights directs medical and legal attention away from affirmative
programs of public education and health care reforms required to ensure healthy
pregnancies and babies. 65
In addition, where the focus is on protecting the fetus rather than helping the pregnant
woman, a physical addiction is not properly recognized as a disease, but rather as a
sign of poor motherhood. Women do not abuse drugs out of lack of care for their
62. Hanigsberg, supra note 4 at 37.
63. Krauss, supra note 4 at 533.
64. Ibid. at 534.
65. Gallagher, supra note 4 at 56.
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infants. Rather, they are unable to control the intake of the substance being abused and
generally do not want to be addicts. As one author has stated:
Addiction typically involves loss of control over use of the drug and continued
involvement with the drug even when there are serious consequences. Thus, to treat
pregnant addicts as indifferent and deliberate participants is to misunderstand the
addiction process.66
Many feminists also disagree with the way in which according sets of conflicting rights
to the pregnant woman and her fetus establishes an antagonistic relationship before
birth, rather than recognizing that mother and fetus are an organic whole. 67 Such an
adversarial contest threatens to undermine the physical integrity of pregnant women
by attempting to distinguish the pregnant woman from the fetus growing inside her.68
There is also an underlying assumption in the fetal rights approach that the best way
to help the fetus is to curtail the rights of pregnant women. But women's needs should
not be seen as opposed to those of their fetuses. According to Overall, the interests of
the fetus and the mother are so intimately bound that:
... one cannot speak about distinct, let alone conflicting, interests without simplify-
ing distortion.69
Although the fetus is not yet a child, it may become one. The relationship between
pregnant woman and fetus is interdependent but not symmetrical: the fetus' existence
depends on the woman but not vice versa. Such a relationship therefore demands not
that equal sets of rights be balanced, but rather that the pregnant woman be accorded
increased rights and interests, since the mother is an independent being without whom
the fetus cannot exist.
Adversarial relationships are not only created between pregnant woman and fetus by
the fetal rights scheme. If doctors are required to report "offending mothers", the very
person who is intended to provide proper medical care and support is set up as a person
adverse in interest to the woman, since the doctor's role becomes one of protecting
the fetus. This may drive women out of the health care system, especially if one of the
consequences of reporting "inappropriate" maternal behaviour is criminal liability.70
Significantly, any reporting requirements would have disproportionate effects on
low-income women who are more likely to lack resources to care for themselves
properly during pregnancy, whether it be proper food, shelter and a healthy lifestyle,
or simply information on healthy conduct during pregnancy.7
1
66. K. Moss, "Substance Abuse During Pregnancy" (1990) 13 Harv. Women's L.J. at 289, as cited in
Hanigsberg, supra note 4 at 53.
67. Hubbard, supra note 4 at 215. See also Tateishi, supra note 4 at 139: "Creating separate individual
rights negates the fundamentally biological relationship between mother and fetus."
68. Tateishi, ibid. at 123.
69. Overall, supra note 4 at 14.
70. Krauss, supra note 4 at 535.
71. Ibid. at 524. See also Dawson, supra note 4 at 271.
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Many feminists also warn that the fetal rights approach would perpetuate negative
stereotypes regarding women. The more weight is placed on fetal rights, the more
women will be seen as unfit to be trusted with their own children. 72 The female body
will come to be seen as dangerous to the fetus because pregnant women cannot be
trusted not to abuse it.73 Tateishi stresses that intervention on behalf of the fetus may
come to be thought of as necessitated by the danger and inefficiency of the female
body. The "Eve" image of women will be perpetuated in the idea of self-interested
mothers whose "hedonism conflicts with the rights of the fetus".74
Since reactionary measures tend to form a part of the fetal rights' vision of state
intervention, many feminists also stress the risks of imposing liability on the pregnant
woman. First of all, imposition of criminal liability drives women away from seeking
help during pregnancy and may encourage abortion as a means of avoiding liability. 75
Punitive solutions may even harm maternal and fetal health since prisons are not an
appropriate setting for pregnancy. Prisons are not necessarily drug free environments
and they are not able to offer suitable drug addiction treatment programs or medical
facilities for pregnant women. 76 In addition, criminal penalties are based on the false
assumption that addictive use of alcohol and drugs by pregnant women is a matter of
choice or a problem of moral weakness. Civil accountability also creates adversarial
relationships between mothers and fetuses since mothers could be held accountable
for even inadvertent behaviour which results in damage to a child.77 Finally, as
mentioned above, reactionary measures compromise the most promising solution to
the problem: provision of adequate health care, including drug addiction treatment
tailored to meet the special needs of pregnant women.
78
Many feminists have also critiqued the competence of the courts to deal with the
complexities of fetal apprehension. Child welfare legislation, the legislation under
which direct apprehension orders have been made, is unable to account for the "unique
social and biological realities of the pregnant woman's context and her constitutional
rights," 79 since it was drafted to deal with children, not fetuses and pregnant women.
In addition, when an order is made under child welfare legislation, it must be made in
accordance with the "best interests of the child" with the result that resolution in favour
of the fetus is virtually guaranteed.80
72. Ibid. at 271.
73. Hanigsberg, supra note 4 at 44. See also Tateishi, supra note 4 at 114.
74. Hanigsberg, ibid. at 46.
75. Holmgren, supra note 4 at 101; Gallagher, supra note 4 at 45.
76. Holmgren, ibid at 101.
77. Ibid. at 95.
78. Berrien, supra note 4 at 242. At 246, Berrien describes an American pilot project initiated to reach
out to addicted pregnant women, but which was largely unsuccessful because punitive measures
were attached.
79. Tateishi, supra note 4 at 133.
80. Ibid. at 130.
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Recourse to mental health legislation is usually not an improvement since a woman's
simple refusal of her doctor's advice is often implicitly equated with mental incom-
petence.8' In addition, an order under such legislation is often utilized to allow the
courts to do indirectly what they cannot do directly. In D.FG., the appellate court
specifically forbade forcible intervention on the basis of a finding of mental incom-
petence, when this route was taken to bring about the same effect as if the law permitted
confinement of pregnant women.8
2
b) Critique of Medical Intervention Cases
This section begins by discussing issues of autonomy. As the autonomy critique may
apply equally to the maternal self-abuse cases, it is a suitable topic to bridge a
discussion of general objections to state intervention in pregnancy and objections
specifically directed at medical intervention. However, since this paper argues that the
autonomy argument is more suitable to the medical intervention context, issues of
autonomy are more aptly dealt with under this heading.8 3
Generally, many feminists have argued that an isolated focus on the fetus obscures the
physical reality that the state cannot take custody of the fetus without infringing on
pregnant women's autonomy.8 4 Pregnancy should not compromise the autonomy
given to competent humans to make decisions regarding their own bodies. Further,
coercive intervention overlooks the possibility of working with pregnant women's
decision-making processes. Ultimate respect of their decisions is the most woman-
affirming approach since it is premised on respect for women's autonomy and bodily
integrity.8 5 Women should be able to participate in meaningful ways in the making of
decisions concerning their own health treatment; there should never be a denial of the
patient's ability to think for herself.8 6 The final concern regarding practices which
abrogate women's autonomy is that coerced medical treatment will remove "the locus
of reproductive decision-making from women and vest it in the medical profession.
87
Underlying the autonomy critique is the premise that a woman's "free" choice should
never be infringed, but this alone is an impoverished theoretical perspective. A
competent woman's decision to undergo a medical procedure can easily be character-
ized as a "free" choice and, therefore, deserving of societal respect and protection.
However, the autonomy critique would apply the same analysis to pregnant women
who ingest intoxicants. But most feminists would agree that drug addiction is often
caused by social constraints and cannot be fully characterized as a result of "free"
81. Martin & Coleman, supra note 4 at 964.
82. See D.F.G., supra note 29.
83. Note that most of the feminist arguments regarding autonomy are based on cases involving medical
intervention.
84. Krauss, supra note 4 at 543.
85. Dawson, supra note 4 at 268.
86. Tateishi, supra note 4 at 135.
87. Krauss, supra note 4 at 531.
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choice. The autonomy critique fails to address this theoretical difficulty by simply
arguing that women's "free" choice should always be protected, no matter how
circumscribed that "freedom" may be. Sections four and five suggest going beyond
this analysis by positing a relational approach as an improved perspective from which
to analyze medical intervention and maternal self-abuse cases.
Forced medical intervention has also been criticized on the basis that doctors' opinions
regarding "necessary" medical procedures are not infallible.88 Doctors will often take
aggressive preventative measures to avoid the worst possible outcome regardless of
the probability of its occurring. The increased number of caesarean sections in recent
years, it has been argued, may be the result of physicians' anxiety about potential
malpractice liability.8 9 Accepted medical practice can also change drastically over a
relatively short period of time and doctors in general are extremely skeptical of
alternative birthing techniques. 90 In addition, judges tend to give special credence to
medical opinions due to their own lack of expertise in the area. 91 Finally, because
action must be taken so quickly in these cases, it is generally impossible to assure even
minimal due process. This lack of opportunity to deliberate increases the chance of
"misapplication of the controlling legal principles and derogation from constitutional
rights. '" 92 In essence:
The procedural shortcomings ... undermine the authority of the decisions them-
selves, posing serious questions as to whether judges can, in the absence of genuine
notice, adequate representation, explicit standards of proof, and right of appeal,
realistically frame principled and useful legal responses to the dilemmas with which
they are being confronted.93
The Charter has inevitable importance in any discussion which involves curtailing
citizens' rights, and many feminists do not hesitate to point to the significance of the
Charter's protection of the rights of pregnant women. Many critics emphasize that
any intrusion upon the physical autonomy or reproductive decision-making of preg-
88. Kolder, supra note 11 at 1192: six out of fifteen caesarean sections were unnecessary. One of the
studies referred to by Hanigsberg, supra note 4 at 5 1, found that up to fifty per cent of all caesarean
sections were unnecessary.
89. Gallagher, supra note 4 at 51.
90. Grant, supra note 4 at 244.
91. Tateishi, supra note 4 at 134-138. At 135-136, Tateishi refers to a recent American case which pro-
vides a good example of how judicial trust of medical opinion can go seriously awry. In that case,
George Washington University and George Washington University Hospital sought a declaratory
order allowing the Hospital to perform a caesarean section on a mother against her will. The mother
was six and a half months pregnant and was terminally ill with cancer. The trial court held a hearing
at the Hospital and granted the application. The child died two hours after the operation and the
mother within two days, the caesarean section operation being one of the factors contributing to the
mother's death. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988),
vacated and remanded 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
92. Martin & Coleman, supra note 4 at 963.
93. Gallagher, supra note 4 at 49.
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nant women violates the Charter.94 Importantly, fetuses have not traditionally been
accorded any rights under the Charter. In Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General)9 5
and Dehler,96 it was held that "everyone" in section 7 did not include the fetus, because
the fetus was not a legal person. This finding was reiterated in Tremblay v. Daigle.
97
Many feminists believe that it is important to maintain the current status of the fetus
because once the fetus is granted legal status, the courts must come down in favour of
intervention; if the fetus is a person, a person has a right to life, therefore the state can
intervene to preserve that life.98
Section 7 of the Charter protects women from forced medical intervention because
liberty and security of the person would be infringed. Importantly also, in situations
where medical intervention would be forced on a pregnant woman, there is no time to
comply with the principles of fundamental justice.99 A quick decision must be made,
when a woman is, for example, in labour and refusing to undergo a caesarean section.
To comply with the principles of fundamental justice, the pregnant woman in question
would need to be informed immediately of the apprehension and she should be granted
a right to make submissions and to consult legal counsel.100 Such precautions are
practically impossible to undertake since generally the procedure must be performed
immediately after a mother refuses to be subjected to it.
c) A Feminist Solution
As previously stated, many feminists maintain that the failure by some pregnant
women to make healthy choices for themselves and their fetuses is a social rather than
a legal problem. The answer, they argue, lies in the socio-economic, psychological
and physical reasons that compel women to make unhealthy choices during preg-
nancy. 101 Society can only help fetuses by helping women. This would involve treating
women as people worthy of support by establishing progressive support programs such
94. See Jackman, supra note 4 at 49; Grant, supra note 4 at 71.
95. (1989] 1 S.C.R. 342,57 D.L.R. (4th) 231,92 N.R. 110.
96. Supra note 15.
97. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530,62 D.L.R. (4th) 634, 102 N.R. 81.
98. Grant, supra note 4 at 220.
99. Medical treatment without consent normally constitutes battery actionable in tort: Reibl v. Hughes,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 880, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 33 N.R. 361; Hopp v. Lepp, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 192, 112
D.L.R. (3d) 67, 32 N.R. 145. Section 7 of the Charter incorporates a general guarantee against
threats of interference with bodily integrity: R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 44 D.L.R. (4th)
385, 82 N.R. 1.
100. Grant, supra note 4 at 228-31. In addition, according to Morgentaler, Ibid., to determine whether the
principles of fundamental justice have been complied with, one must consider whether any other
Charter rights have been violated. For example, some individuals may object to procedures such as
caesarean sections on religious or conscientious grounds, resulting in a potential infringement of
s.2(a). As Grant has pointed out, "women from various ethnic backgrounds have profoundly differ-
ing religious and personal beliefs regarding child birth." In particular, people from Jamaica, Haiti and
Africa place social stigma on use of the caesarean section.
101. Holmgren, supra note 4 at 103.
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as drug treatment facilities where participation is seen to be an indication of good
mothering, and where free nutritious food, information and counselling are all pro-
vided. 102 The goal must be to uncover the "roots of self-destructiveness" and treat
them effectively so as to avoid placing a deeper wedge between mother and fetus by
establishing opposing interests. 103 Such progressive and pro-active measures would
help prevent state intervention after birth thus avoiding the need for out-of-home (e.g.
foster) care. 104
IV. A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
This section attempts to establish the theoretical basis for a solution to maternal
self-abuse during pregnancy, should the feminist pro-active approach fail to assist. It
addresses only those situations where pregnant women are abusing themselves during
pregnancy. This approach is intended to avoid situations where a pregnant woman
consistently refuses help, to her own and her fetus' detriment, and there is no other
recourse to provide any assistance. Currently, the state waits until the child is born
and subsequently may take custody under child welfare legislation, leaving the mother
in the same adverse circumstances as before the child's birth, but without the oppor-
tunity of developing a relationship with her child. The focus of this section is on
preserving the maternal-fetal relationship both before and after birth in all situations,
regardless of whether the pregnant woman voluntarily complies with a recommended
course of action or refuses to do so.
a) A Relational Reconception of Autonomy
To determine whether and when intervention in pregnancy constitutes a derogation
from women's autonomy, the theoretical underpinnings of autonomy must be exam-
ined to establish in which contexts it is possible to conceive of intervention as
potentially enhancing autonomy rather than necessarily undermining it.
Traditionally, liberalism has taken atomistic individuals as the basic units of legal
theory. Consequently, autonomy has come to be viewed as an independence which
requires separation and protection from others. An individual's personal choice is
therefore almost always considered a proper exercise of her autonomy since it
originates from her independent existence. The state ought to protect these "autono-
mous" decisions by preventing any infringement of them.
Much feminist work, conversely, tends to emphasize relationships between people
rather than treating people as autonomous with identities existing prior to their social
102. Hanigsberg, supra note 4 at 68-9.
103. Tateishi, supra note 4 at 138.
104. Krauss, supra note 4 at 537. For an entirely Canadian version of the pro-active approach, see Can-
ada, Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Government Services
Canada, 1993) (Chain P. Baird) vol.2 at 949-65.
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relationships. 10 5 Relational theorists especially focus on the importance of relation-
ships in shaping and forming human existence and posit that we take our being from
our relations with others. 106 Although feminists are centrally concerned with freeing
women to shape their own lives, it cannot be forgotten that people are the products of
their social contexts. From a relational perspective, to use the language of Nedelsky,
we must "combine the claim of the constitutiveness of social relations with the value
of self-determination" by focusing on the centrality of relationships in constituting the
self.10 7
Traditional notions of autonomy, therefore, must be reconceived in a way which
recognizes both the importance of self-determination and the constitutiveness of social
relations. Autonomy, which is defined by Nedelsky as "one's own law", is shaped by
the society in which one lives and the relationships which are a part of one's life.
Although autonomy is one's own, it is not made solely by the individual. Rather the
individual develops it in connection with others.108 In other words, the capacity to find
one's own law can develop only in the context of relations with others which nurture
this capacity. Relationships enable people to be autonomous; they provide the support
and guidance necessary for the development and experience of autonomy. Therefore,
positive social conditions and healthy relationships are prerequisites to the proper
development and exercise of autonomy.
b) Protecting Autonomy as a Fundamental Value in Society
To protect a reconceived notion of autonomy as a fundamental value in our society,
our conception of the relation between the individual and the state must change. A
right which protects a fundamental value such as autonomy should not be seen as
defining a bounded sphere into which the state can never intrude. It should rather be
conceptualized as "a means of structuring the relations between individuals and
sources of collective power so that autonomy is fostered rather than undermined."' 109
Since rights mediate and often define relationships, we must examine ways of either
enhancing or limiting them in order to foster the relationships which rights form.
In liberal rights theory, the individuals to be protected by rights are seen as essentially
separate, rather than as beings whose interests and needs are intertwined. 110 Conse-
quently, respecting the delineated boundaries which rights protect draws our minds
away from the relationships which they form. III A relational reconception of auton-
omy forces us to see rights not as a mechanism which shields the individual from the
105. Minow, supra note 6 at 194.
106. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy", supra note 6 at 9.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid at 10.
109. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship", supra note 6.
110. Ibid. at 13.
111. Nedelsky, "Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self', supra note 6 at 178.
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state but rather as a vehicle through which autonomy may be "rendered compatible
with the interdependence of human beings.""12
From this perspective, the scope of rights, whether this involves protecting a value or
limiting the extent of that value, must be determined by the kinds of relationships we
want to foster. However, in order to find the optimal relation between the individual
and the state which fosters the relationships in which autonomy is created, we must
discern what constitutes autonomy:
We cannot understand or protect ... autonomy unless we attend to what gives citi-
zens a sense of autonomy, to what makes them feel competent [and] effective.... 1 13
This may involve inquiring into whether official action denies citizens basic respect
or treats them in ways that make them less able to participate effectively in decisions
affecting their own lives.11 4 Citizens who participate directly in decisions affecting
them are less likely to relinquish their autonomy when they accept the benefits or
control of the state, because they have had some say in how the law will affect them.
V. A RELATIONAL SOLUTION
If we view autonomy as developed by the individual in relations which provide the
support and guidance necessary for individuals to make what they feel are competent
and effective decisions, we can no longer call a woman's decision to harm herself and
her fetus an autonomous choice. People do not choose to suffer adverse social
conditions or to purposefully harm the positive relationships which constitute their
social contexts:
Women do not abuse drugs out of a lack of care for their fetuses. Drug abusing
pregnant women, like other drug abusers, are addicts. People do not want to be drug
addicts. 115
There are two relationships at risk here. One is the maternal-fetal relationship which
may be severed after birth because of the mother's inability to care for her child due
to her addiction or lack of ability to provide proper care, or because of physical harm
caused to the fetus. The second is the relationship between pregnant woman and state,
which possesses the power to apprehend the child after birth or otherwise hold the
mother liable for her treatment of the fetus prenatally.
Protecting the value of a "reconceived" autonomy in our society may involve using
state power to ensure that the relationships which foster autonomy are preserved.
Consequently, a scheme which seeks ultimately to enhance women's autonomy may
involve temporarily limiting the extent of freedom of choice in the interests of
112. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship", supra note 6 at 13.
113. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy", supra note 6 at 25.
114. Ibid. at 34.
115. Hanigsberg, supra note 4 at 53.
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protecting the relationships between the pregnant woman and her future child and the
woman and the state. To establish the extent to which we must limit a woman's right
to make choices regarding her conduct during pregnancy, we must examine which
measures will best contribute to the fostering of the maternal-fetal relationship. The
goal is not to create an adversarial relationship between the woman and her fetus but
rather to foster that relationship. Consequently, any infringement on women's
informed decisions should be prohibited in the interests of furthering autonomy and
the relationships which create it.
The only situation where intervention may be justified, and only then where all
pro-active, non-coercive measures have been exhausted, is when a pregnant woman
has made unhealthy choices because she suffers from an addiction or because she has
no other meaningful options. In these situations, however, there must be safeguards
to ensure that official action provides citizens with basic respect and treats them in
ways that allow them to participate effectively in the decisions which will affect their
lives.
This approach proposes establishing a new agency designed specifically to deal with
the particular needs of pregnant women. Its objectives would be to unearth and rectify
the causes of maternal self-abuse during pregnancy and, most importantly, to preserve
the maternal-fetal relationship both before and after birth. Its enabling legislation
would establish a pro-active, preventative approach, 116 while providing for forced
intervention, as a last resort, where a mother is abusing herself during pregnancy and
refuses any assistance. 117 The procedures would be designed not simply to force the
mother to cease any self-destructive behaviour, but also to inquire into the causes of
her situation and attempt to rectify them on a personal level. The ultimate goal is
rehabilitation and consequently helping the woman and the fetus, once born, to
establish a long-lasting relationship in which the autonomy of both may be fostered.
Any state action to intervene in the lives of citizens must accord basic respect and
enable citizens to participate effectively in decisions which affect their lives. There-
fore, the system must follow due process which would involve requirements that
agency officials immediately inform the pregnant woman of the intention to intervene
and that the pregnant woman be given an opportunity to make submissions and seek
counsel. A hearing would then be provided with adjudicators consisting of experts in
obstetrics and gynecology, psychology and women's studies, to ensure that the
complexities of the contexts which cause maternal self-abuse are duly considered. The
agency would be required to prove that coerced intervention is warranted by satisfying
a test outlining the criteria to be considered. The criteria must have as their underlying
purpose the preservation of the maternal-fetal relationship. Such factors as the risks
to the pregnant woman and the fetus' health and the potential of the woman to function
116. See section III.
117. In situations where mothers refuse to undergo medical procedures, this approach would only provide
for recourse to counselling. Under no conditions could the agency attempt to apprehend the mother
or override her decision-making capabilities forcibly.
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as a fit parent if her conduct continues should therefore be considered." 8 Hopefully,
this process, if established to be as non-adversarial as possible, would effect voluntary
compliance. However, if it is found that coercion is necessary, the pregnant woman
would be placed in a facility properly equipped to deal with her needs.1 19 Importantly,
any assistance, whether or not it was provided on a voluntary basis, would result in a
presumption of fit motherhood so as to prohibit child protection proceedings based
solely on allegations of "prenatal abuse".
Since the scheme does not accord the fetus legal personhood or rights, the procedures
must only refrain from infringing the mother's rights under section 7 of the Charter.
The provisions would require strict adherence to due process in order to make them
accord with the principles of fundamental justice. Therefore, they would either be
found not to violate section 7 or to be justified by section 1. Also, refraining from
according fetuses rights equivalent to those of pregnant women avoids placing women
and their fetuses in adversarial positions. The scheme recognizes the interdependence
of pregnant woman and fetus but acknowledges that the fetus' interests are entirely
dependent. The focus is therefore appropriately placed on helping the pregnant woman
which in turn necessarily helps her fetus. It also avoids blaming individual pregnant
women because the emphasis is on rectifying the cause of the problem, rather than
dealing superficially with the results.
Providing a scheme which specializes in dealing with maternal self-abuse during
pregnancy will help avoid situations where judges use minor offences as devices to
incarcerate pregnant women and protect the fetus. There would now be an appropriate
forum to address judicial concern regarding maternal self-abuse during pregnancy. A
specialized scheme would also avoid the danger of courts resorting to legislation not
designed to deal with the complexity of issues in this area. Importantly, also, since the
fetus is not accorded personhood or rights, a prohibition on any kind of reactionary
measures theoretically follows. A specific provision in the legislation to that effect
would prevent the scheme from deterring women from seeking prenatal care. In fact,
the presumption of fit motherhood might actually encourage women to seek assis-
tance.
Finally, it has been established that women suffering from poor socio-economic
conditions, who tend to belong to minority groups, are disproportionately represented
in the group of women whose conduct during pregnancy could warrant intervention.
120
Therefore, any measures taken must be implemented in a culturally sensitive manner.
This could be accomplished by special outreach programs in different communities
which are run by members of that community acquainted with the specific difficulties
118. This would protect against coercion for less serious conduct such as smoking tobacco or having the
occasional alcoholic drink.
119. Clearly, the mother would not be held indefinitely. If the worst result occurred and the facility was
unable to help the mother heal, she would be released after the birth of her child and offered more
assistance, which she would be entitled to refuse.
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women encounter therein. The facility would provide counselling by trained members
of the community who understand the issues pertinent to that specific culture. The
system would be mandated to be culturally sensitive in all the ways in which it involves
itself in the lives of pregnant women, 121 whether through voluntary compliance on the
part of the pregnant woman or through forced intervention, thus further assisting in
preserving the future relationship between mother and child in the social setting in
which they live.
VI. CONCLUSION
Undeniably, no solution to the debate surrounding state intervention in pregnancy
would satisfy every member of society. The topic is fraught with moral and political
dilemmas which can probably never be reconciled. Nonetheless, most believe that
society should take some responsibility to deal with the problem. No approach,
however, can be held out as necessarily correct; only the results of a scheme's
implementation could conclusively prove that its means are capable of meeting its
goals. One may try to refine ideas for political action with reference to specific
contexts, but positive results can never be absolutely guaranteed. They may only be
more or less likely within a given situation; conclusive proof is unattainable until a
historical analysis can be undertaken. Regardless of one's perspective, most will agree
that some action must be taken since, as current case law reveals, the relationship
between mother and child, one of the most important relationships in which autonomy
is fostered in our society, appears to be in jeopardy.
121. Provisions in Ontario's Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C-11 could be used as a
model. See ss. l(e) and (f) which establish as one of the purposes of the Act that services should be
provided in a culturally sensitive manner.
